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ABSTRACT
This article assesses the assumption that populist parties form an efficacious
exhaust valve for voters, the channelling discontent thesis, as it is termed here.
Drawing on in-depth interviews with Dutch PVV voters and (deliberate) non-
voters, I assess this thesis in a comparison between them. This analysis shows
that non-voters do not lack political fulfilment on two of the three dimensions
of efficacy I distinguish. On the third, it is not electoral participation, but
respondents’ perceptions of the locus of political power that explains
differences in what I term ‘meaningful’ political agency. This inductively
generated power-orientation theory contextualises the channelling discontent
thesis, demonstrating that it only effectively applies to those citizens who
share the definition of the situation the thesis assumes. I argue that these
findings highlight an institutional blind spot in the study of populism and
political discontents, and make a case for a cultural-sociological perspective.
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Introduction
(… ) I thought there was no one who’s listening anyway. And now, since Pim
and Geert there are two who are listening (Interviewee Carola).
The emergence of populist political parties in Western Europe has given
rise to much popular and academic debate. Many contemporary West
European populist parties have a new-rightist character with anti-immigra-
tion agendas, making their inﬂuence on the quality of liberal democracy the
centre of debate. On the one hand, these parties articulate the attitudes of
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDer-
ivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Roy Kemmers kemmers@euc.eur.nl
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/23254823.2017.1339203
signiﬁcant portions of the respective populations, as can be illustrated by
media ‘vox pops’ and election results, making them a classic example of
legitimate democratic representation. On the other hand, their nativist
anti-immigration agendas give rise to concerns about these parties’ alle-
giance to liberal democratic principles such as the rule of law and the
rights of minorities (for example, Plattner, 2010; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012).
In their theoretical framework for the analysis of populism as a threat
or a corrective to democracy, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser
(2012) argue that this cannot be an either/or question, but that populism
has some features that strengthen as well as others that weaken aspects of
liberal democracy. These authors explain (part of) populism’s relation
with democracy: ‘Since [democracy] is based on the periodic realization
of free and fair elections, it provides a mechanism by which people can
channel their dissatisfaction with the political establishment’ (2012,
p. 17, emphasis added). Therefore, these ‘democratic benefits’ of populism
comprise what will be termed here the channelling discontent thesis: the
idea that the institutional articulation (in political parties) of popular dis-
contents about politics and society benefits democracy and the people
concerned. Discontented citizens, this line of thought argues, experience
political fulfilment through voting for a party that voices their discontents,
regardless of whether discontents are ‘expressed’ or (also) ‘fuelled’ (Roo-
duijn, Van der Brug, & De Lange, 2016; Van der Brug, 2003). This chan-
nelling discontent thesis refers to a broader assumption in classical
democratic theory, one that can be traced back to de Tocqueville’s Democ-
racy in America (1840/1998; cf. Lijphart, 1968, p. 170). This is the idea that
political party organisations, or ‘intermediate groups [function] as chan-
nels through which popular participation in the larger society (especially
in the national elites) may be directed and restrained’ (Kornhauser, 1960/
1998, p. 77). This channelling function of organisations is also central to
Almond and Verba’s (1963) influential theory of the civic culture as a
recipe for stable democratic systems. Channelling is thus basically institu-
tionalising popular political passions – or in this case discontents – in a
rational, regulated fashion.
Whereas this theory seems compelling with regard to the level of demo-
cratic systems (i.e. nation states) at which it is formulated, it remains to be
seen how it works out at the level of citizens. By extension, this theory
would assert that voting for a populist party provides discontented citizens
with a political ‘exhaust valve’ and a resulting sense of political fulfilment.
Respondent Carola’s quote above resembles one of many that audiences
have been able to see and hear in West European news and current
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affairs programmes in the last two decades: ordinary citizens professing
their feelings of fulfilment in connection with a populist politician who
addresses issues that have, in their view, remained unaddressed for too
long. It is this sense of popular political efficacy as a result of populist
party voting that is central to this study.
It is, however, not self-evident that popular political discontents are sat-
isfactorily ‘channelled’ into elections, because the populist ideology hosts
an inherent anti-institutional tension. While populism has recently been
analysed as a performative political style (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014) and
as a discursive frame rather than an ideology (cf. Aslanidis, 2015), the
most influential definition of populism is Cas Mudde’s, who states that
it is an ‘ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” and “the
corrupt elite” and which argues that politics should be an expression of
the volonté generale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde, 2007, p. 23;
2004, p. 543; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 8). It suggests that
‘the people’ wish to see their general will reflected in politics, unrestrained
by regulations, laws, and procedures. This anti-institutionalism is a feature
of populism that is widely recognised. ‘In general’, Kriesi notes (2014,
p. 363), ‘populism has a strong anti-institutional impulse – the romantic
impulse of directness, spontaneity and the overcoming of alienation
(… .).’ Its hostility towards institutionalisation can also be seen in the
ways populist parties organise; Taggart argues that ‘populist parties
organize themselves in ways that are in contrast to those of existing
parties. One of the reasons for this is that populism has an inherent dis-
trust of political institutions in general and political parties in particular’
(2000, p. 75; cf. Johansson, 2014). Taking this anti-institutionalist element
into account, it is not at all self-evident that an ideal-typical populist
citizen could be persuaded to vote for any party, even one that claims
to challenge the establishment. Seen in this light, deliberately not voting
is a justifiable alternative for discontented citizens. A party, after all, is
bound by laws, procedures, and ‘the rules of the game’. While voting
for a populist party should thus, on the one hand, generate a sense of
democratic fulfilment, the necessity of rules, procedures, and compro-
mises that such political participation brings in its wake may fuel frustra-
tions because it makes the populist party resemble any other party.1
Populism, in sum, may not always desire to be ‘channelled’.2 This is there-
fore an inherent tension in populist ideology that may be negotiated by
politically discontented citizens in different ways: some may attain a
sense of political fulfilment from having their discontents channelled by
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populist parties, while others who may abstain from voting are seemingly
deprived of such an efficacious ‘exhaust valve’, but are also spared the
‘institutional frustration’ connected with it.
This article is the result of an inductive study of politically discontented
citizens in the Netherlands and seeks to address this issue by comparing
experiences of political fulfilment3 on the parts of populist-party voters
and deliberate non-voters. Research shows that political discontents are
highest among PVV voters and non-voters (CBS, 2011), so these are
theoretically strategic categories to sample for research on these discon-
tents. In the Netherlands, the populist radical-right Freedom Party
(PVV, Partij voor de Vrijheid), led by Geert Wilders, has been the most
successful populist party from 2006 onwards, continuing the legacy of
the late populist Pim Fortuyn (Houtman, Achterberg, & Kemmers,
2012) with an agenda that combines anti-immigration (more specifically,
anti-Islam) with anti-establishment discourse. The research question this
study addresses is: what are the differences in political efficacy between
populist party voters and non-voters and how can these differences be
explained? Reflecting the inductive, theory-building character of the
study, this article is constructed to alternate findings and theoretical
reflection before answering the research question and addressing its
implications.
Method and data
The focus of the research problem is on discontented citizens’ experiences,
perceptions, and ‘definitions of the situation’, making in-depth interviews
a straightforward data-collection method, as ‘individual constructions can
be elicited and refined only through interaction between and among inves-
tigator and respondents’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 111, emphasis in orig-
inal). The aim is to find out how they make sense of politics, society, and
account for their meaningful actions. To answer the research question, in-
depth interviews were conducted with 18 Dutch citizens who voted for the
PVV or deliberately refrained from voting in the 2012 parliamentary elec-
tions. Comparing non-voters’ and PVV voters’ political fulfilment should
permit an assessment of the channelling discontent thesis; after all, both
categories consist of (largely) politically discontented citizens; one of
these has their discontents channelled, and the other does not. Studying
this negotiation between deliberate non-voting and voting for a populist
party is, of course, facilitated by the Dutch electoral system of proportional
representation, which sets a relatively low threshold for newly emerging
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(anti-establishment) parties. In recruiting respondents, I looked for diver-
sity within these two categories of respondents. Some interviewees were
contacted through webforums and social media, where they had indicated
their voting behaviour, others via informal networks, and some via snow-
ball sampling. Since these respondents were not part of a random sample,
but rather citizens who accepted an invitation to participate, they are likely
to be more outspoken and politically aware, and therefore not representa-
tive of discontented citizens in general, nor of their respective categorical
populations of populist-party voters or non-voters.4 (Table 1 provides a
concise overview of the ‘sample.’
The non-voters were deliberate abstainers in the (largest) Dutch general
elections for parliament. Deliberate non-voters are different from non-
voters who, for example, may not vote because the weather was bad or
who forgot about Election Day altogether: the respondents’ abstention
therefore is meaningful social action in the Weberian sense (Weber,
1968/1978, p. 4). The sample consists of 10 deliberate non-voters in this
sense and 8 PVV voters. All interviews were conducted between Septem-
ber 2012 and January 2013. The Dutch Second Chamber (general parlia-
mentary) elections took place on 12 September 2012 and its campaigns,
results, and consequences served as valuable topics for conversation.
The radical-right populist party PVV (Freedom Party, Partij voor de Vrij-
heid) of Geert Wilders gained 10.1% of the vote and the turn-out rate was
74.6%, making the share of non-voters just over a quarter of the eligible
electorate.5
Table 1. Overview of respondents’ names (pseudonym, as used), gender, age, and voting
behaviour.
Name Gender Age PVV/NV
Ron M 64 PVV
Maria F 64 PVV
Willem M 68 PVV
Daan M 21 PVV
Wouter M 40 PVV
Carola F 44 PVV
Henry M 53 PVV
Tim M 46 PVV
Theo M 33 NV
Judith F 44 NV
Chris M 31 NV
Gerard M 53 NV
Dennis M 39 NV
Annemieke F 39 NV
Eric M 31 NV
Ben M 63 PVV
Arthur M 52 NV
Mark M 58 NV
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Most of the interviews were conducted in the respondents’ homes,
some in another location of their choosing, and they lasted between two
and over six hours. I informed my respondents that their perspectives
were underrepresented in social scientific knowledge and that our conver-
sations were about their opinions, activities, and perspectives, and that
there could thus be no right or wrong answers. This resulted in a generally
pleasant atmosphere, frequent elaborations on their personal lives, and
occasional invitations to the researcher to stay for dinner. This, along
with the sheer openness they demonstrated in their answers, indicates
that rapport was established (cf. Boeije, 2010, p. 62). The interviews
were loosely structured around people’s voting motivations, what they
think is right or wrong about present-day politics, and how they evaluate
the role of the media. In addition, a significant amount of time was used to
talk about the respondent’s biography, with a specific focus on how they
attained their current perspectives on politics and society.6 The interviews
were recorded and transcribed, and the names of respondents have been
changed to protect their anonymity.
The results presented below are the product of an inductive analytic
process that involves theoretical sampling and the constant comparison
of cases (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006). This process started
off with the straightforward assumption that populist-party voters attain
a sense of political fulfilment, while non-voters do not. Upon encounter-
ing cases that contradicted this working hypothesis (Glaser & Strauss,
1967, p. 39; Charmaz, 2006, p. 103), an alternative explanation for differ-
ences in efficacy emerged inductively. This analysis is presented below in
terms of a conceptualisation of political efficacy along three dimensions
that was formed through connecting these emergent themes with estab-
lished literature. These dimensions – collectivisation, representation,
and ‘meaningful’ political agency – were then employed to re-read the
data and compare non-voters and PVV voters, and serve to structure
the results sections that follows.
Citizens’ meaningful political agency
In order to be sensitive to politically discontented citizens’ subjective sense
of political fulfilment, we need to depart from the traditional conceptual-
isation of political efficacy, which refers to the ‘feeling that individual pol-
itical action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process
(… )’ (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954, p. 187), or ‘judgments people
hold about their abilities to perform effectively in the political domain’
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(Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009, p. 1003). As a sensitising
concept (Charmaz, 2006, Ch. 2) that ‘suggest[s] directions along which to
look’ (Blumer, 1954, p. 7) in this study, an alternative conceptualisation is
necessary because of a too-rigid focus on both ‘effectiveness’ and on ‘the
political domain’. Politically discontented citizens, after all, may not
regard the political domain as responsive enough, or politicians as trust-
worthy enough, for their actions to be able to be effective at all. Hence,
their political activities may not be geared towards generating such
effects. For the conceptualisation of efficacy to be open to discontented
citizens’ possibilities of political fulfilment, it should focus on meaning
instead of on effect, and on what people themselves define as political
(Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2010) instead of on the political domain in the
technical sense. For this purpose, political efficacy is conceptualised
here in terms of judgements people hold about their abilities to perform
meaningfully in politics.
Collectivisation: A political sense of belonging
PVV voters, first of all, talked about being part of ‘a group of many’, or
sometimes of ‘the majority’ of what they tend to refer to as common, or
‘ordinary people’. Talking about the most recent election results, or the
rise of the PVV in general, these citizens interpret the expansion of the
PVV’s social basis as a sign of recognition of their own and other ordinary
people’s societal and political concerns. They express relief that their con-
cerns are ‘finally’ voiced, as ‘something you have felt for a long time, but
couldn’t put into words’ (Daan, 21). Respondent Maria (64), who, as many
PVV voters do, sees in Wilders’ PVV a continuation of the ideology of the
late Pim Fortuyn, says:
(… ) I have also abstained from voting for years. It was actually when Pim
Fortuyn came, that was when I thought like ‘Okay, this is clear, to the point,
and exactly what I’m thinking,’ ideas I could see myself in. Not in the back
rooms, but loud, clear and in the open.
In their qualitative study on how supporters of the Flemish populist party
Vlaams Belang (VB) were transformed from individual citizens into an
electorate, Kochuyt and Abts (2012) report that these supporters experi-
enced a sense of collectivisation of their concerns for society: seeing the
election results, these citizens report a feeling that they are ‘not alone’:
‘The growing number of [VB] votes holds up a mirror to loners who
see that they together with many others constitute a silent majority’
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(2012, p. 104, author’s translation). Respondent Henry (53) also says that
Fortuyn created an opening for ordinary people: ‘He has made things clear
for a lot of people in a very simple way. At ﬁrst it [politics] was something
for the elite and then these things started to become alive among the
people.’ That someone addressed their concerns made them feel part of
a larger collectivity. The individual ﬁnds her multiplication in a collective,
as Charles Taylor highlights this aspect of Tocqueville’s theory:
Ordinary people acquire democratic efficacy, and therefore the sense of this
efficacy, through a proliferation of voluntary associations. These are close
enough to the base to be potentially under its control, and they have enough
collective clout in the larger society to compel power wielders to listen to
them. In the absence of such intermediary bodies, each individual would
stand alone against state power and those who control it, utterly powerless to
deflect its course and control its impact on their lives (2007, pp. 127–128).
For discontented voters, the electoral collectivity of a populist party elec-
torate may therefore be experienced as being part of a group of like-
minded people, or being part of an ‘imagined political community’
(Anderson, 1983/1991) of ‘the people’ that citizens may experience fulﬁl-
ment in this sense. To put this in Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s terms:
‘populism can give voice to groups that do not feel represented by the
elites’ (2012, p. 21).
Remarkably, when turning to the abstaining respondents, it became
clear that a similar sense of collectivisation had accompanied their delib-
erate electoral inactivity. Non-voter Arthur (52) sees in the percentage of
abstainers a form of affirmation of his views of contemporary politics. An
artist and age-old loyal voter, he has always seen voting as a civic duty, but
now he says he has had enough. When discussing the 25-or-so per cent of
abstainers, he says that ‘that means I’m part of a really big group of angry
citizens.’ And Mark (58), an unemployed process operator, is very active
on weblogs on which he discusses the wrongdoings of politicians, royals,
and businessmen, who come together in the Bilderberg group. He argues
that the group of non-voters will have to grow in order to really make a
difference: ‘Twenty-four percent did not vote. That is not enough. It
will only have an impact when 75–85% doesn’t vote. That’s when the
people will get a voice (… ), that’s when it will be noticed.’ These non-
voters, therefore, consider themselves part of a larger group of dissatisfied
citizens: the seemingly anonymous category of abstainers is made sense of
as a more or less coherent collectivity. On the blog to which Mark fre-
quently contributes in the comments sections, it was even posted that
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‘the party of the non-voters had won the elections’ with their 25% share of
the election results.
While this may seem an overly optimistic interpretation of the figures,
it is only slightly different from the claim by political scientist E.E.
Schattschneider in his seminal The Semi-Sovereign People, where he
emphasises the potential power of the non-voting subpopulation:
[W]e are governed by invisible forces, for to an astonishing extent the [voting,
author] sixty million are at the mercy of the [nonvoting, author] rest of the
nation which could swamp all existing political alignments if it chose to do
so. The whole balance of power in the political system could be overturned
by a massive invasion of the political system, and nothing tangible protects
the system against the flood. All that is necessary to produce the most painless
revolution in history, the first revolution ever legalized and legitimatized in
advance, is to have a sufficient number of people do something not much
more difficult than to walk across the street on election day (1960, pp. 98–99).
These deliberate non-voters, therefore, do not lag behind the PVV voters
in terms of their political sense of belonging: while being part of a sizable
and recognisable group does give the populist-party voters a sense of
ﬁnally being heard, these non-voters appear to interpret their contribution
to the election results with a similar sense of collectivisation.
Representation in the public sphere
Populism often addresses issues (such as immigration, law and order, or
corruption) that have supposedly been addressed insufficiently or inade-
quately by the established parties of the political system in question.
‘[P]opulism can represent excluded sections of society by implementing
policies that they prefer’, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser note as one of its
benefits (2012, p. 21). To operationalise, this aspect emphasises citizens’
feeling of being represented in public debate and the public sphere. This
sense of representation is indeed what the PVV voters in the sample
attest to in the interviews. Maria notes that if it were not for the PVV ‘I
think I wouldn’t go out to vote. Because (… ) the others say this but do
that. And I still feel that the PVV, Wilders, is the only one who tells it
how it really is.’ And Willem (69) states that he ‘will remain loyal to
Geert Wilders, that’s just how it is.’ Tim argues that voting for Wilders
has yielded results, since it has brought the immigration problem into focus:
At one point politics had just abandoned us by letting them [immigrants] in.
And that should just be stopped. They’re doing it now, but they should have
closed the door a bit tighter 15 to 20 years ago (Tim).
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Others value Wilders’ presence on the stage for more pragmatic reasons.
Ron, for instance, considers himself a classic Fortuynist and is less
enchanted by Wilders. And Wouter sees in Wilders an important rep-
resentation in public debate of a genuine anti-Islam voice, but he does
not see Wilders protecting the Christian values he would prefer seeing
represented. PVV-voting respondents also identify with policies that
have been proposed by the PVV, but argue that Wilders is not always
given the credit he deserves. Carola says that the coalition parties that
Wilders supported until 2012 have co-opted his plans:
[F]rom the beginning, they did not really want to cooperate with him. He has
tried everything to make it work. He has had to make concessions and they have
constantly given him a hard time. And once he was out, in the blink of an eye
they cut the budget for development aid! All these issues he stands for, he had
had to make compromises for, they did them anyway! And he gets the blame
[for blowing up the coalition, author]! That’s when I think this is just outra-
geous (Carola).
Regarding the PVV voters in the sample, it can be said that their support
indeed makes them feel represented in the public sphere, as well as con-
ﬁdent that actual results have been achieved. Charles Taylor illustrates
this dimension of efﬁcacy by using the gains of the historical working-
class movement as a concrete example:
Just as a private in a victorious army may share in the sense of triumph even
though the general never asked his opinion, so can a worker, a peasant, or
small craftsman in a condition of relative class war have a sense of efficacy
from the collective gains of the movement (Taylor, 2007, p. 128).
Experiencing representation in the public sphere may take shape in politi-
cal institutions, as in seeing that one’s issues are addressed in parliament,
but also in the broader arena of public opinion and debate. Indeed, many
‘new’ social movements from the 1960s onwards do not engage in their
claims-making for the sake of inﬂuencing state policy. They ‘are not
focused on the political system’ (Melucci, 1980, p. 220), but rather see
themselves as ‘involved in struggles over the deﬁnition of meanings and
the construction of new identities and lifestyles’ (Nash, 2000, pp. 100–
101).
Among the non-voting respondents in the sample, this sense of rep-
resentation in the public sphere is – again − not absent, as might be
expected. As indicated above, Mark and his online friends from his
forum discuss and propagate non-voting among themselves. While this
may be confined to the virtual spaces they frequent, this cannot be said
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of Chris (31) and Gerard (53), who, apart from their online activities, had
set up a non-voting campaign before the 2010 elections. In this campaign,
they printed, and distributed throughout the country, posters that adver-
tised their ‘I don’t vote’ website, through which they informed visitors
about how voting maintains a corrupt system in which decisions are
made regardless of the outcome of elections. And these activities have
yielded real results, they argue. Chris notes that he is witnessing a
change in people’s awareness:
Five years ago, if you posted a comment on a forum saying something anti-pol-
itical, you would generate a lot of counter-reactions. And my experience is that
if you do the same now, you won’t get any reaction. People aren’t opposing it
any more, they are increasingly agreeing that this is not a democracy, that it is
not our interests that are being served (Chris).
And Gerard, who posts on his own website his analyses of how the New
World Order has set up democracy to make Western populations believe
that they are in control, is increasingly receiving invitations to give lectures
or take part in meetings in groups of businesspeople and scientists:
Regularly, I get invited for small clubs of people who think collaboratively on
certain topics. Small think-tanks. With all sorts of people. For example I
recently took part in a think-tank of economists. So then I was sitting among
economics professors.
He sees this as a sign of increasing responsiveness to his ideas and ana-
lyses. These examples demonstrate that that these non-voters’ means of
raising awareness and achieving cultural change, which is often the goal
of non-institutionalised politics (e.g. Nash, 2000), appear to be working
very well for them. Summarising: in terms of experiencing visibility in
the public sphere and in attaining results, PVV voters and deliberate
non-voters do not diverge in their satisfaction with their respective
decisions.
Meaningful political agency
Thus far, this study has contended that the populist-party voters do not
necessarily have an advantage over the deliberate non-voters in terms of
a sense of belonging to a larger collectivity and representation in the
public sphere. One of the most often acknowledged benefits of populism
for democracy is that it ‘can mobilize excluded sections of society (… ),
improving their political integration’, as Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser
note (2012, p. 21). Populism thus provides citizens with an opportunity
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for meaningful political action. The spectrum of possible political activities
is, however, not confined to electoral participation alone. As argued above,
especially when political discontents are concerned, institutional political
participation is not always straightforward: political action need not be
geared towards the ‘official’ political-institutional infrastructure. Not
much is known about the motivations of non-voters, but research does
show that abstention from electoral participation does not unequivocally
imply complete disengagement (e.g. Doppelt & Shearer, 1999; Wuthnow,
2002; Shyrane, Fieldhouse, & Pickles, 2006; Bennettt, Cordner, Klein,
Savell, & Baiocchi, 2013; Hooghe & Marien, 2013). People can perform
meaningful political activities via other means too, as will become clear
below.
When it comes to examining these respondents’ meaningful political
activities, however, a divergence emerges, one that does not coincide
with the distinction between non-voters and populist-party voters.
When I noticed some PVV voters who did not and some non-voters
who did experience fulfilment from their respective political actions, it
became clear that an alternative to the channelling discontent thesis was
needed. The contours of this alternative explanation thus became visible
after some of the interviews appeared to contradict the channelling dis-
content thesis.
Power-orientation theory
This alternative explanation is here termed power orientation and it refers
to a subjective sense of where the centre of political power is located. It is a
latent – that is, not always explicit – ‘definition of the situation’ that struc-
tures individuals’ observations, interpretations, and subsequent meaning-
ful actions, and it is often implicit in their ways of talking about politics
and society, in how they refer to political power. These definitions of
the power situation, or schemas of power (Tannen & Wallat, 1987;
Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614), concern answers to questions like ‘How
do political decisions come about?’ ‘Who makes these decisions?’ ‘What
processes determine who will be in charge?’ and ‘Which institutions are
important in these processes?’ There are two poles to this dimension.
The first consists of the (conventional) position that political power is
concentrated in the official legislative institutions: the government, sup-
ported by a majority of the elected representatives in parliament. This is
therefore an orientation to the official, or conventional, system of politics,
as it is laid down in official laws and is canonised and taught in schools.
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Such an orientation is referred to here as a transparent power orientation.
In this study, respondents who tend towards this position refer to ‘The
Hague’ (the governing capital of the Netherlands), the political parties
that operate in it, and the politicians whose faces personify Dutch politics
when they talked about politics and political power. Respondent Tim gave
an apt illustration of such an orientation when asked why he thinks going
out to vote is so important:
Because the people you can vote for, they are going to govern your life. They
will decide what your life is going to look like, now and in the future. So it’s
very important to think about that and, yeah, well… (… ) participate. I just
think that’s an obligation, you’re obligated, to yourself and to society (Tim).
What Tim describes as his deﬁnition of the political situation is an
example of what I have termed a transparent power orientation: political
representatives who are elected in ofﬁcial elections legitimately decide how
the government is to act.
At the opposite end of this dimension, there is the orientation that
considers power to be in the hands of ‘unofficial’ forces. Respondents
who tend towards this end of the dimension may refer to abstract
market forces represented in discourse about ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘multi-
nationals’, as Judith does when she says she was surprised to find out ‘to
what extent politics resembles child’s play when compared to the power
of multinationals and the economic sector more generally.’ But people at
this pole of the dimension may also refer to more explicit analyses of
undemocratic coalitions, for example, offering accounts involving the
Bilderberg group or the New World Order, acting to pursue their
goals and interests. Since accounts like this imply unofficial forces
pulling strings behind the public scenes, this end of the dimension is
termed an opaque power orientation. Respondents at this end of the
dimension only refer to the official system in order to deny its impor-
tance when compared to ‘those really in charge’. When respondent
Gerard, for instance, is asked why he thinks ‘the power elite’, as he
calls it, is more powerful than (‘official’) politics, he says ‘simply
because what they do has more influence than what politics does’
(Gerard).
This ideal-typical dimension turns out to be more fruitful in explaining
differences in political fulfilment among these discontented citizens than
the initial working hypothesis that differentiates between populist voting
and deliberate non-voting. The sections below will illustrate how both
power orientations ‘work’ to produce these differences.
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‘I’mnot taking part in this anymore’: Transparent power orientations
The PVV voters in the sample who consider the Dutch governing capital
The Hague as the centre of political power report experiencing fulfilment
from their votes. They say that they follow political news on a daily basis
and in talking about politics, they refer to the type of things the media
report on when it comes to politics: what is discussed under the
heading of current affairs, statements by political leaders on these
issues, and the differences between them. These respondents’ sense of ful-
filment is illustrated by their trust in the view that Geert Wilders’ ideas and
proposals will alter the existing hegemony of the established parties, and
that their votes will bring this future situation a step closer. Respondent
Willem states that he has been active in filing complaints against mislead-
ing advertisements for over 35 years. He does this because he values
honesty: ‘People are being fooled, they are being deceived right in front
of their noses. I support truthfulness and honesty.’ In Geert Wilders
and his plans, Willem recognises exactly the virtues he holds so dear:
‘That’s what I think is receiving due attention in Geert Wilders’ [plans].’
Such positive experiences also inspire further involvement: Carola
received attention from Wilders himself when she started to attend
party meetings. As she recounts it, this makes her feel part of a
community:
And that’s when you meet Geert himself and Fleur [Agema, a PVVMP, author]
and just the whole group, they’re just great people. And Geert, he just recog-
nises me in one way or another. (… ) He’ll say, ‘Hey there, nice to see you.’
Respondent Maria, who also has faith in Wilders’ plans, is convinced that
Wilders is the only one who tells it like it is. And he doesn’t just talk, but he acts
as well. And that doesn’t mean that he will deliver everything, but you can tell
that he is striving for that. And I think that is just as important. Not everyone
will achieve their goal in life, but striving for it may be just as fulfilling (Maria).
Maria’s remark underlines the importance of how political activity may
not be as effective as conventional politics in terms of inﬂuencing
decision-making, but may nonetheless be meaningful in terms of ‘giving
fulﬁlment’ to people who engage in it (Canovan, 1999).
Respondents with a transparent power orientation who abstained from
voting, however, do not report the fulfilment that Maria and Willem do.
Although their transparent power orientation provides them with a clear
idea of where and by whom political power is performed, their abstention
from participation in the elections appears to give them a sense of
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powerlessness. They agree that they have, at least temporarily, turned their
backs on it. Arthur says that he had been a loyal voter for all his life, but
that now he has given up on politics:
The last couple of years I started thinking will I go [out to vote] or won’t I? And
then at the last moment I eventually did go, but now I am really through with it.
We’ve seen such ridiculous situations in the Hague and ehm, I’m not taking
part in this any more, I don’t belong to these people any more, I don’t feel com-
fortable any more with this, with these people (Arthur).
As he is not politically active in any other way, Arthur’s statement displays
a sense of disillusionment and resignation. And this is understandable
because the only relevant political power has fallen out of favour with
him. Eric is a similar kind of ﬁrst-time non-voter for whom frustration
has built up in the last years:
I’ve done my civic duty for a long time, but politicians have long neglected their
duties to rule the country. For years, not since [the mid-90s]. And then I am
supposed to go out to vote again… , to make an effort for a cabinet that will
probably not think about governing? (Eric).
These men are not active in other types of political involvement that might
counter the establishment or in seeking alternatives, so their abstention is
the only meaningful means of political action they use. As Eric summar-
ises it, when he reacts to a commonly heard criticism of non-voters:
It’s just not true that you’re not taking your civic responsibility if you don’t vote.
Not voting is also an expression of ‘I’m through with it, I don’t want this any
more.’ This is not my government, not my representation. And that’s also an
expression, that’s also a form of voting.
This shows that among respondents with a transparent power orientation,
the PVV voters experience fulﬁlment from their political actions while the
non-voters do not. These PVV voters are excited that things are ﬁnally
changing for the better: their discontent, we may conclude, has been suc-
cessfully ‘channelled’. But although the non-voters report their abstention
as meaningful behaviour, as signalling a clear message to the world of poli-
tics, their statements and their further inaction exude a sense of resigna-
tion, a display of powerlessness.
‘A crowbar to disrupt the establishment’: opaque power orientations
The PVV voters who verge towards an opaque power orientation occupy a
somewhat ambivalent position. These are people whose perceptive scope
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extends beyond the borders of institutional politics and for whom their
votes for the PVV therefore have different meanings from that they had
for PVV voters with a transparent power orientation. This becomes
clear from their analyses of politics. Ron, for instance, refers to himself
as an ‘intellectual PVV voter’, as someone who does not blindly follow
Wilders, but sees in him a tool with which the establishment may be
opened up:
[T]he intellectuals who vote for him, or the people who have a wider view on
society, they’re using him, as I’m doing, as a crowbar. As a man who disrupts
the system, allowing for an opportunity so that more sound people… (… ) so
that change will come and that the Establishment will be, in a manner of speak-
ing, forced by the crowbar to take different positions. Whether it’s a utopia,
time will tell. I’m afraid it is. You just don’t crash into an established fortress
that easily with a little crowbar (Ron).
Respondent Ben, who self-identiﬁes as Jewish-Christian, is an example of
how channelling discontent can generate its own discomfort. Since he is
mostly concerned about the threat he says Islam poses for the Western
world and about the European Union’s growth in political power at the
expense of nation states, he welcomes Wilders’ radical opposition on
these issues. The EU, Ben argues, is more and more coming to resemble
the biblical story of the Tower of Babel. ‘God gave us different languages
because he intended people to live in small groups,’ he argues, and he thus
considers the EU the antithesis to the divine will. However, Geert Wilders
does not profess the Christian values Ben would also like to see rep-
resented. This discontent with the PVV made Ben decide to vote ‘none
of the above’ in the 2012 elections:
Well, I think I did that [vote for the PVV] twice and then I saw how the PVV
was also a disappointment, especially its lack of a Biblical tone. They’ve never
had that and politically the party is also badly organised: it’s ridiculous to con-
tinue that one-man show.7 And that’s when I thought I’m through with it,
apparently there’s nothing I can vote for, so I will vote for no-one (Ben).
Ben, who was recruited as a PVV voter in this study, ‘admits’ that, while he
has voted for the PVV several times, he has now voted ‘none of the above’
out of discontent with the PVV. This marks the ambivalence of people
with an opaque power orientation towards voting: both Ron and Ben
argue that unofﬁcial forces are dominating the political landscape and
that their votes for the PVV are best understood in terms of Ron’s
crowbar metaphor. Both of them are active in their blogs in publishing
their analyses of corruption within ‘the Establishment’ or ‘the leftist
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church’ (Ron), or of the (Christian) road to ‘real Truth’ and the dangers of
Islam (Ben). Henry reports a similar ambivalence: he votes for the PVV
and agrees with its party leader Wilders, but he places his real hopes for
change in extra-parliamentary action. In particular, he considers new
media such as blogs and YouTube ‘a real power for the people in the
streets’ because their power is not controlled by the Establishment as
mainstream media are. In this excerpt from the interview, he wonders
What if it were as big as ehm, what’s it called, from Korea, that clip?
R: ‘Gangnam Style?’
Henry: ‘Yeah, that one, imagine that in a political sense.’
R: ‘And receiving 200 million views.’
Henry: ‘Do you think that could spread all over the world? Or would it be cut
off somewhere down the line?’
Henry’s ambivalence thus revolves around his hopes for the possibilities of
uncontrolled (social) media in creating a grass-roots mass political move-
ment, and his fear of the power of the Establishment to control what mess-
ages actually reach the people.
Abstainers with an opaque power orientation appear to be remarkably
active outside electoral politics. They participate, for instance, in Occupy
or in other (for instance anarchist) collectives. A week before the elections,
Judith (46) organised a voting-pass-burning event, which was announced
in a press release and recorded on video, thereby dramatically performing
her abstention from the elections in public in front of an audience. The
fact that she did not do this to influence institutional politics became
clear when I asked her about it:
[I]t is not so much a signal to politics, because I couldn’t care less if they hear
about it or not. What I want is to let other people know: hear this, you don’t
have to accept things the way they are presented to you.
It is clear that Judith is someone who is very politically engaged, albeit
exclusively outside the institutional domain. As a self-identiﬁed anarchist,
she takes autonomy and self-responsibility very seriously and thus, when a
number of asylum-seekers expressed the wish to learn the Dutch language,
she started teaching them, without notifying the centre at which they were
awaiting their procedures:
Well, you go and visit the centre and you have to register with someone [an
inhabitant]. So I just go and visit someone, he registers me and we go and sit
in the canteen and do the lesson. That’s a political choice that has a lot to do
with autonomy (Judith).
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When respondent Mark discussed his motives for abstention, he pre-
sented his (unused) voting pass, in a frame, as a non-voting trophy to
be hung on the wall, saying ‘I’m proud of this.’ He said that he developed
the idea of doing this with his friends on the web forum he frequents. For
Mark and Judith, their abstention was therefore a powerful message that
was announced, performed, and documented before a real-life or virtual
audience.
Other instances of politically meaningful activities these non-voting
respondents engaged in had to do with work and consumption. Protesting
against the waste of good products in contemporary consumer society, the
anarchist couple Annemieke and Dennis had been active ‘dumpster
divers’ for about a year. They collected two or three carloads of produce
from trash containers at wholesale companies and distributed it among
families on welfare. And Dennis, who works as a truck driver, has told
his boss he refuses to do assignments for one of the company’s customers,
agricultural multinational Monsanto: ‘I just don’t want anything to do
with it. (… ) And in fact, announcing this raises some eyebrows.’ His
refusal is respected by his boss, as long as it does not lead to any conflicts
in the work schedule. Dennis accepts the fact that he is not eligible for
welfare if he were to lose his job for this reason: ‘So be it. [B]ut otherwise
I’d think I’d just be a hypocrite (… ) while I am just absolutely opposed to
that company.’ Meaningful political activity, for these respondents, can
cover anything but electoral activity.
Among those respondents with opaque power orientations, a feeling of
political efficacy is manifested quite clearly among the non-voters, in con-
trast to the PVV voters. These PVV voters’ accounts are characterised by
ambivalence over their votes, while the non-voters are rewardingly active
outside the electoral realm of politics. In sum, the channelling discontent
thesis appears to be reversed among those with opaque power
orientations.
Conclusion
This study has assessed the assumption that populist parties form an effi-
cacious exhaust valve for voters, the channelling discontent thesis. By
comparing Dutch PVV voters with non-voters and focusing on the mean-
ings these citizens attribute to their (non-)votes, it has sought to answer
the research question: what are the differences in political efficacy
between populist-party voters and non-voters and how can these differences
be explained?
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To answer this question, I conceptualised political efficacy in a way that
makes it sensitive to the political agency of politically discontented citizens
by distinguishing between the dimensions of collectivisation, represen-
tation in the public sphere, and meaningful political agency. The analysis
shows that PVV voters do not have a systematic advantage over non-
voters with regard to the first two dimensions: non-voters do not lack a
sense of belonging to a collectivity or a feeling of being represented in
public debate. Examining meaningful political action, however, my
respondents’ accounts were sometimes actually contrary to what one
would expect based on the channelling discontent thesis. This thesis,
therefore, does not adequately explain differences in political efficacy
between non-voters and populist-party voters.
Instead, a different dimension was inductively conceptualised that does
explain these differences. This dimension I termed power orientation; it
consists of the respondents’ (sometimes implicit) definitions of the situ-
ation with regard to where political power is located and who the main
actors are who possess such power. This dimension was conceptualised
with two ideal-typical poles: a transparent power orientation, in which
the conventional (or official) notion of politics is the centre of political
power; and an opaque power orientation, in which the power of ‘official
politics’ is denied in favour of shady, undemocratic forces pulling the
strings from behind the scenes. Among those with a transparent power
orientation, populist-party voters did report political fulfilment while
non-voters did not; and among those with an opaque power orientation,
the non-voters appeared to have an efficacious advantage over the popu-
list-party voters, one that is related to their non-institutional political
activities.
The channelling discontent thesis, therefore, may seem convincing at
the system level at which it has been developed, but when it comes to
ordinary citizens’ experiences, it appears that these people themselves do
not always share its underlying assumptions. ‘Channelling discontent’ as
a function of populist political parties ‘works’ only for citizens whose
orientations to power allow it to work. For discontented citizens who loca-
lise power outside the system – and such an orientation to politics is
gaining ground (cf. Aupers, 2012; Harambam & Aupers, 2015; Haram-
bam, 2017) – engaging in electoral political activity is either met with
ambivalence or deemed nonsensical: parties do not appeal to them.
Instead, they evade the system by engaging in meaningful activities
outside the political-institutional infrastructure of voting and parties (cf.
Eliasoph, 1998; Bennettt et al., 2013). The power-orientation theory
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presented here thus does not so much contradict as contextualise the
channelling discontent thesis that is often mentioned as one of the benefits
of populism for democracy.
These findings demonstrate the importance of taking seriously the per-
ceptions of the people involved, not just in their (non)voting motivations,
but also in the definitions of the situation that underlie such motivations.
This recalls Eliasoph and Lichterman’s notion of ‘cultures of politics’,
which they contrast with different definitions of ‘political culture’: ‘A
focus on cultures of politics helps us ask how and when people decide
they are doing something “political”, instead of defining individuals,
organizations, or issues as political, powerful or not powerful by scholarly
fiat’ (2011, p. 491). The present analysis has shown that among the non-
voting respondents, for instance, there is a certain ‘consensus’ in their
non-voting motivations: they all say in some way that they ‘don’t want
to take part in this charade.’ But beneath these motivations lie very differ-
ent definitions of the situation, which, in their turn, fuel different actions
and experiences.8
This study therefore sheds light on a blind spot in social theory on pol-
itical discontents in which ‘conventional understandings of politics as
linked to public discussion and decision making in designated insti-
tutional sites’ (Dean, 2014, p. 454) are taken as an exclusive point of refer-
ence. Although this practice may cause less theoretical concern in other
areas of study, when studying populism or ‘political disaffection’ in
Western democracies (e.g. Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Hay, 2007; Stoker,
2006), significant aspects of politically relevant meaning-making and
behaviour will escape this dominant framework. Related to this, the
present study also emphasises the inherent anti-institutional tension in
populist ideology. This insight, combined with the fact that studies by
Mudde (2007; 2010) and Elchardus and Spruyt (2012) show that populist
ideologies are much more widely shared than would be indicated just by
the electoral bases or party programmes of the available populist parties
(see also Rooduijn, 2013; Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014;
Kemmers, Aupers, Houtman, & van der Waal, 2015), suggests that scho-
lars of populism as an ideology would do well to look beyond the realm of
institutionalised politics and delve more deeply into the varying ways
ordinary citizens themselves make sense of populism. This paper’s cul-
tural-sociological analysis, with its focus on meaning, performance, and
practices, is thus able to contribute to what has been termed ‘an affective
and aesthetic turn in democratic theory’ (Coleman, 2013, p. 234; cf.
Saward, 2006).
20 R. KEMMERS
Finally, in this study, I have advanced a conceptualisation of political
efficacy that is more sensitive to citizens’ fulfilment from political activities
that are not geared towards the institutional domain. Future quantitative
research may benefit from this by designing surveys that include reference
to this sensitivity to anti-establishment attitudes. Survey questions are not
seldom formulated in such a way as to inquire to what degree individuals
feel able to influence ‘institutional’ politics (Campbell et al., 1954; Hooghe,
2003; Caprara et al., 2009). Anti-elite (‘populist’) individuals who oppose
the establishment (and may approve of an outsider – or populist – poli-
tician) are in such cases classified as inefficacious; in fact, they may
have flourishing political lives with regard to this outsider politician or
outside the official political realm altogether. Including such items along-
side those already in use would allow the distinction between (internal)
political efficacy – with an orientation towards system and effectiveness
– on the one hand, and more broadly meaningful political agency – allow-
ing for a wider range of meaningful political action – on the other. The
former would then still be used as an indicator of the perceived legitimacy
of the system (e.g. Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990), while the latter would
allow us also to capture discontented citizens’ political meanings and
actions.
Notes
1. Taggart (2000, Ch. 1) uses this point to argue that populist parties have a
limited growth capacity: as soon as one grows too large, it will fall apart.
2. See also Canovan’s (1999) discussion of populism’s appeal to the redemptive
side of democracy, which is contrasted by the ‘pragmatic’ side that relates to
consensus seeking and taking responsibility.
3. In essence, political efficacy and political fulfilment refer to the same thing. In
this article, the term ‘political efficacy’ is used when referring to the theoretical
concept and ‘fulfilment’ as indicating the reported concrete experiences of
citizens.
4. The data collection was not intended to collect a representative sample of either
discontented citizens in general, or PVV voters or non-voters in particular.
Rather, it was (purposeful) theoretical sampling (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 96–
122), by which I aim at theory building and choose each next respondent
based on what they can contribute to the emerging theory. In that effort, a
study of the more outspoken individuals of a broader social current may be
‘the best strategy to obtain “information-rich” cases that can give in-depth
insight into the subject of study’ (Reybold, Lammert, & Stribling, 2013,
p. 702) Thus, in the beginning, I aimed at as much diversity as possible;
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later, I started to focus on the emerging categories that appeared theoretically
most fruitful.
5. Official public Databank election results of the Kiesraad at http://www.
verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/Na1918/Verkiezingsuitslagen.aspx?VerkiezingsTypeId=1
(retrieved 28 May 2017). Since compulsory voting was abolished in 1970, turn-
out rates in the Netherlands have not been high or low compared to other
European countries (Blais & Aarts, 2006, pp. 41–43), and are among the top
third compared with other OECD countries, according to Pew Research
(http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/02/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-most-
developed-countries/, retrieved 28 May 2017).
6. The biographical part of the interviews deserves mentioning here because it
considerably influenced the length of the interviews, but obviously also contrib-
uted to the rapport noted above. The ‘socialisation’ of the respondents into their
current perspectives, is, however, part of another analysis, that answers a differ-
ent research question (Kemmers, Aupers, & van der Waal, 2016). For the
current analysis, it is relevant because the insights used to answer the present
research question have come from also taking those parts of the interviews
into account.
7. Ben refers here to the party structure of the PVV; the party has only one
member (Wilders). The party has attracted criticism on this account and has
even seen representatives leave because of it. Wilders and his associates gener-
ally legitimise their case by expressing a fear of hostile infiltration once mem-
bership would be opened up to all.
8. The exit-voice-loyalty framework (Hirschman, 1970) has been suggested at
different occasions as possibly applicable to the analysis of non-voters in this
study. Applying it in the realm of democratic theory, Warren (2011) made a
case for ‘exit’ as a form of empowerment, theorising that the possibility to
exit and choose an alternative option benefits the quality of democracy. The
opposite of exit, he argues, is the lack of options, a monopoly. However, both
Hirschman’s and Warren’s theory theorises ‘exit’ in relation to the objective
qualities of the democratic system, not – as I am doing here – as a meaningful
course of action based on citizens’ subjective definition of the political situation.
Whether exit – either as choosing a different party or as non-voting (Warren,
2011; Schäfer, 2016, respectively) – is efficacious therefore depends on whether
a citizen experiences either a range of alternative options, or a monopoly.
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